If a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and is not time-consistent. This paper derives conditions for when trading fossil fuel deposits increase e¢ ciency. In isolation, a bilateral transaction may occur too often or too seldom compared to the optimum. However, when the market clears, the above-mentioned problems vanish, the …rst-best is implemented, and the coalition …nds it optimal to rely entirely on supply-side policies, which are simple to implement in practice. These results strengthen the case for a climate policy that limits the supply of, rather than the demand for, fossil fuel.
Introduction
Some countries are unlikely to ever join a legally binding climate treaty. Only 37 countries are currently committed to binding targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Since these commitments are set to expire in 2012, the United Nations negotiated the Copenhagen Accord in December, 2009 . The Accord recognizes the need to reduce global CO 2 emissions but it does not legally bind the signatories in any way. Despite this, it was unable to secure full participation.
While nonparticipants are likely to pollute too much, the main concern is that they might undo the climate coalition's e¤ort. When the coalition introduces regulation, world prices change, market shares shift, industries relocate, and nonparticipants may end up emitting more than they did before. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007:665) de…nes carbon leakage as "the increase in CO 2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries." Most estimates of leakage are in the interval 5-25 percent, but the number can be higher if the coalition is small, the policy ambitious, and the time horizon long.
1
Carbon leakage discourages countries from reducing pollution and may motivate them to set border taxes or tari¤s on trade.
2 Thus, Frankel (2009:507) concludes, "it is essential to …nd ways to address concerns about competitiveness and leakage."
This paper considers a coalition of countries harmed by the consumption of fossil fuel. Countries outside of the coalition are naturally polluting too much compared to the optimum. In addition, if the coalition reduces its demand for fossil fuel, the world price for fuel declines and the nonparticipating countries consume more. If the coalition shrinks its supply of fossil fuel, the nonparticipants increase their supply. If countries can invest 1 See the surveys in IPCC (2007), Frankel (2009), and Rauscher (1997) . The variation in estimates hinges on a number of factors. Elliott et al. (2010) estimate leakage rates of 15-25 percent, increasing in the level of the carbon tax. Babiker (2005) takes a long-term perspective by allowing …rms to enter and exit, and …nds that leakage can be up to 130 percent. For the countries signing the Kyoto Protocol, Böhringer and Löschel (2002: 152) estimate leakage to have increased from 22 to 28 percent when the US dropped out.
2 While estimates of leakage vary, the Financial Times writes "the fear of it is enough to persuade many companies to lobby their governments against carbon regulation, or in favour of punitive measures such as border taxes on imports" (Dec. 11, 2009) , but: "the danger is that arguments over border taxes could make an agreement even more di¢ cult to negotiate" (Nov. 5, 2009) and it is an "easy way to start a trade war" (Dec. 9, 2009). in renewable energy sources, nonparticipants invest too little compared to the …rst-best levels. For the coalition, regulating their own consumption, production, and trade is a second-best solution. However, in equilibrium, the coalition sets policies so as to in ‡uence its terms of trade as well as the environment.
The …rst main result (Theorem 1) provides a condition for when there exist gains from bilaterally trading a marginal fossil fuel deposit. The coalition may bene…t from purchasing the right to exploit a fossil fuel deposit that is, in any case, quite polluting or costly to exploit. After such a purchase, the coalition will preserve rather than exploit the deposit. Since this alters the world fuel price, third parties may thus su¤er or bene…t, depending on whether they are net importers or exporters of fuel. Hence, bilateral trade may occur too often or too seldom.
Nevertheless, Theorem 2 shows that, once the market for deposits clear, all the abovementioned problems vanish and the …rst-best outcome is implemented. In equilibrium, the coalition purchases the right to exploit the fossil fuel deposits that are most polluting or very costly to exploit. As a result, the nonparticipants'supply becomes locally inelastic, the supply-side leakage is eliminated, and the coalition chooses to rely entirely on reducing its supply and not its demand. Consequently, the consumption price is equalized across countries, and all investments are then e¢ cient.
Although the model is simple and stylized, the results strengthen the case for a climate policy that focuses on the supply side, including the supply of foreign countries. In reality, a market for exploiting fossil fuel deposits already exists, since countries frequently sell, auction, license, or outsource the right to extract their own oil and other minerals to international companies as well as to major countries such as India and China. 3 Instead of inventing such a market, the paper is analyzing its potential as a climate policy. Note that the …rst-best policy is simple to implement once the market for deposits has cleared: the coalition only needs to set aside certain deposits by, for example, specifying an extraction fee high enough to make them unpro…table. The coalition then has neither the desire nor the need to regulate consumption or trade in addition. As observed by Elliott et al. (2010:466) : "in practice, a production tax is simpler to administer because of the 3 For a history of the oil industry and the involvements of governments, see Yergin (2009). relatively few sources." Furthermore, rather than purchasing foreign deposits, a leasing arrangement may su¢ ce.
The paper combines two strands of literature. On the one hand, there is a growing literature on carbon leakage, based on the prediction that not all countries will participate in a climate coalition. 4 Markusen (1975) showed that one country's environmental policy a¤ects world prices and thus both consumption and pollution abroad. In addition, capital may relocate (Rauscher, 1997) and …rms might move (Markusen et al., 1993 (Markusen et al., , 1995 . The typical second-best remedy is to set tari¤s or border taxes (Elliott et al., 2010; Rauscher, 1997; Hoel, 1996; and Markusen, 1975) . 5 However, countries have incentives to let the tari¤ in ‡uence their terms of trade. 6 In fact, Liski and Tahvonen (2004) show that a country may bene…t from being harmed by pollution if this justi…es border measures.
Most of this literature focuses on demand-side climate policies. In many ways, Hoel (1994) provides the most general model by also allowing the coalition to limit its supply.
Since the game by Hoel is a proper subgame of the game I present, this paper generalizes several of the above results before obtaining its main results.
On the other hand, the literature following Coase (1960) argues that the parties can attain e¢ ciency by negotiating activities ex post, no matter the allocation of property rights. The coalition should then be able to negotiate with and bribe nonparticipating countries to reduce their consumption of fuel. The literature on leakage must thus assume that transaction (or contracting) costs prevent such e¤ective ex post negotiations. Coase (1960: 15) admits that such transaction costs often exist. But, rather than predicting leakages, Coase (1937 and 1960) suggested that such transactions should and will take place inside "the …rm." This has inspired Williamson's (1975) theory of the …rm as well as literatures on vertical integration and horizontal mergers. Although there is no consensus on how to model coalition formation, environmental agreements have often been modeled as a two-stage process: …rst, a country decides whether to participate; second, the participants maximize their joint utility by choosing appropriate policies. This procedure typically leads to free-riding (see Barrett, 2005 , for a survey of this literature).
5 Certain environmentally motivated border measures are indeed permitted by the WTO, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, signed in 1987, does contain the possibility of restricting trade from noncompliant countries.
6 Rauscher (1997:3) observes that "Green arguments can easily be abused to justify trade restrictions that are in reality only protectionist measures and it is often di¢ cult to discriminate between true and pretended environmentalism."
7 See Gaudet and Salant (1991) or Kamien and Zang (1990) on horizontal mergers, and the survey by
The two strands of literature have remained distinct since it would not be realistic to politically integrate "only" to mitigate climate change. However, note that Perry and Porter (1985) model mergers basically as trade in input factors. Trading input factors may be possible even if Coaseian bargaining over output is not: First, the ownership of production factors is tangible and possible to protect, while contracts on output is not.
Second, in international policies, it might be politically di¢ cult to persuade voters to pay foreigners to reduce their emissions, but the policy is rather conventional if the country, in return, receives the right to exploit certain deposits. Third, such transfers go to depositowners rather than consumers (or their governments). This may be cheaper, as argued in Section 4.6. Finally, it may be possible to estimate extraction costs, which dictates the deposit price, but it can be quite hard to verify the utility-reduction which dictates the compensation for abatement.
It is apriori not clear whether a market for inputs is su¢ cient for e¢ ciency. 8 In fact, several scholars have shown that the Coase Theorem fails when there are more than two players and/or there are externalities on third parties. 9 This motivates a literature studying when factor trade leads to concentration of market power. 10 To my knowledge, Bohm (1993) is the only other paper studying whether analogous trade in fossil fuel deposits may help a coalition curb climate change. Assuming linear demand and supply curves, Bohm investigated when a reduction in consumption should be accompanied by an identical reduction in supply. This may necessitate purchasing or leasing foreign deposits, and Bohm documented that this could be realistic in practice.
11 Katz (1989) or Rey and Tirole (2007) on vertical integration. 8 A literature on international trade, initiated by Mundell (1957) and surveyed by Jones (2000) , investigates whether trade in input factors is a perfect substitute to trade in …nal goods. In this paper, trading factors is strictly better since there are externalities and the factor owner can unilaterally decide whether the factor is to be used for production. 9 For example, e¢ ciency may fail if participation is voluntary (Dixit and Olson, 2000) or side contracting possible (Jackson and Wilkie, 2005) , particularly if there are externalities on third parties (Segal, 1999) . 10 For example, Esö et al. (2010) investigate when a market for capacity leads an industry to maximize its total surplus. In the electricity sector, trading the transmission rights before generating power may help the providers maximize joint pro…t (Joskow and Tirole, 2000) . These papers suggest that trading inputs may substitute for ex post negotiation, but they study concentration of market powers and not the internalization of externalities, more generally.
11 In contrast, the literature on tradable pollution permits (surveyed by Tietenberg, 2006) , presumes that all trading countries are participating in the coalition. Trading permits within the coalition is just a way of obtaining a certain emission reduction e¢ ciently and it does not eliminate leakages.
Building on these contributions, Theorem 1 below states conditions under which a bilateral trade in inputs is mutually bene…cial -even if it reduces global welfare. When the deposit market clears, Theorem 2 shows that the …rst-best is implemented in the benchmark model. Thus, e¢ ciency is often obtained, even if Coaseian bargaining on output is impossible ex post, if just key inputs are tradable ex ante.
This insight can certainly be applied to other situations. For example, boycotting timber is an ine¤ective way of preserving tropical forests since the timber price thereby decline, leading other buyers to increase their consumption. A more e¤ective solution, according to this paper, is to pay developing countries to reduce their deforestation. The recent emergence of REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) funds is consistent with this conclusion. Such funds have now been set up by the United Nations, the World Bank, and Norway.
While the next section presents the basic model, the main results are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 generalizes the model and the results by allowing for investments in technologies, multiple periods, and heterogeneous fossil fuels. That section also discusses alternative market structures and endogenizes participation. Section 5 concludes and addresses the limitations of the results. The Appendix contains all the proofs.
The basic model
There are two sets of countries: one set, M , participates in the climate treaty while the other set, N , does not. This paper focuses on the interaction between these sets and thus abstracts from internal con ‡icts or decision-making within M . I will thus treat M as one player or country. The nonparticipating countries in N interact with each other and with M only through markets.
Every country bene…ts from consuming energy, but fuel is costly to extract. If a country i 2 M [ N consumes y i units of fuel, i's bene…t is given by the function B i (y i ), which is twice di¤erentiable and satis…es B There is a world market for fuel and p measures the equilibrium price. Assuming quasi-linear utility functions, the objective functions are
where the harm H (:), experienced by M , is a strictly increasing and convex function. I assume that only M , and not i 2 N , takes the environmental harm into account in its objective function. In fact, country i's indi¤erence may explain why it is not participating in the climate treaty in the …rst place. Alternatively, one could assume that nonparticipants act as if they have no environmental concerns, because, for example, domestic forces hinder the implementation of a climate policy unless the government has committed itself by signing an international treaty. 12 The extension in Section 4.4 allows i 2 N to be harmed by pollution. Section 4.3 permits various fuels (such as gas and coal) to di¤er in their environmental impact.
I assume that country i 2 N chooses x i and y i taking the fuel price as given. This is natural if the decisions to consume and produce are decentralized to agents with little market power. Thus, this assumption does not imply that i; as a country, is tiny. Alternatively, the price-taking assumption would hold if p followed from the climate policy set by M earlier in the game. In any case, this assumption is relaxed in Section 4.5.
To cope with the environmental harm, M sets environmental policies. This amounts to setting x M and y M if relying on quotas for extraction and consumption. The price for fuel will then adjust to ensure that the market clears:
Since the market-clearing condition must hold, and P N (y i x i ) = x M y M depends on p, the outcome would be identical if M could instead choose x M and p and let y M clear the market. Similarly, M may regulate x M and y M by setting a tax x on domestic production, a tax y on consumption, and perhaps even a tari¤ I on imports (or such an export subsidy). Any tax vector = f x ; y ; I g is going to pin down x M , y M , and 12 Similarly, it may be di¢ cult to liberalize trade policies for political reasons, but being committed by a trade treaty can help (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001 ).
p. The outcome is going to be identical no matter how M in ‡uences these variables, and the choice between quotas and taxes is therefore immaterial in this model. 13 In any case, the equilibrium fuel price is in ‡uenced by M 's policies and M does, of course, take this e¤ect into account.
The novel part of the model is that I endogenize C i (:) by allowing for trade in deposits. 14 There is a continuum of deposits, and the cost function C i (:) implicitly orders a country's deposits according to their extraction costs. This is natural, since a country that is extracting x i units would always prefer to …rst extract the deposits that have the lowest extraction costs. A small deposit allocated between x 0 i and x This would change both cost functions from the solid to the dotted lines in Figure 1 .
As a result, C 0 i may be a correspondence, and not a function, if we de…ne and no price such that both i and j strictly bene…t from transferring the right to exploit 13 This is in line with Weitzman (1974) , who shows that uncertainty regarding the parameters is necessary to rank quotas and taxes.
14 Of course, the aggregate world-wide cost function is exogenously given. For any allocation of deposits, we could write it as:
a deposit from i to j at that price. If this condition is not satis…ed, there are still gains from trade. With this equilibrium concept, I can check whether a particular allocation of deposits, leading to a particular C i (:) and C M (:), constitutes an equilibrium.
Note that I do not need to specify a market structure leading to this equilibrium.
But, as discussed in Section 4.6, there are several possibilities. For example, one could let i 2 (M [ N ) make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other countries, conditional on the o¤er being accepted by everyone.
The timing of the game is given by Figure 2 : after the deposit market clears, M sets its policies and, …nally, the fossil fuel market clears. 15 The next section solves the game by backwards induction in order to characterize all subgame-perfect equilibria. Several extensions are discussed in Section 4. 
The equilibrium
As a benchmark, the …rst-best is given by equalizing every country's marginal bene…t of consumption to the marginal cost of production plus the marginal environmental harm.
For any given allocation of deposits, this means:
15 I do not allow nonparticipating governments to set policies in ‡uencing supply and demand. Allowing for this would complicate the analysis without altering the main result, as argued in Section 4.5.
The market for fuel
At the third stage, each nonparticipating country, i 2 N , simply sets its marginal bene…t such that:
The demand by i 2 N is thus given by D i (p). On the production side,
is a strictly convex function, the correspondence C 0 i (:) is invertible and its inverse,
For the coalition M , supply and demand depend on the policies determined at the second stage. 16 In equilibrium, p is such that the market clears:
Equilibrium policies
At the second stage, M chooses x M and y M to maximize
16 For example, y M could be set directly by a consumption quota, while x M could be set directly by an extraction quota. Alternatively, the government may specify a tax vector and redistribute the revenues lump sum within M . If the consumers and suppliers in M are price-takers when trading fuel, x M and y M would be given by:
Clearly, x M and y M can be implemented by any two of f x ; y ; I g. Lemma 1. M 's equilibrium policy implements: 
M would focus on demand-side policies and reduce y M , if foreign supply were elastic relative to demand. But if demand were more elastic than supply, M would focus on reducing its supply x M rather than its demand.
In addition, the last term in (3.5)-(3.6) show that M sets policies considering their impact on its terms of trade. If M is exporting fossil fuel, M prefers to reduce its production and increase its consumption, since both changes increase the price M receives for its exports. M 's ability to a¤ect the equilibrium price is another reason -in addition to free-riding and the two types of leakages -why the …rst-best is generally not achieved.
Lemma 1 is, basically, identical to Hoel's (1994) equations (9)-(10). Hoel shows that M 's ideal policy can be implemented by taxes on domestic consumption and production:
Note that the sum of the taxes is always equal to H 0 , the marginal harm.
Alternatively, (3.5)-(3.6) can be implemented by a production tax and a tari¤ (while y = 0). The equilibrium policies are then as in Markusen (1975) and Hoel (1996) :
The production tax should be Pigouvian and the emission from M 's supply is thus independent of the terms-of-trade e¤ects. This is in line with Proposition 8 in Copeland and Taylor (1995) . The leakages are dealt with by the tari¤. Since the tari¤ reduces domestic consumption, it should be high if the demand-side leakage is low while the supply-side leakage is large. To a¤ect its terms of trade, M sets a high tari¤ if it is importing but a low tari¤ (or export subsidy) if it is exporting.
When are there gains from trade?
Consider 
Part (a) describes when i and M can bene…t if i sells the deposit to M . If (3.7) holds, there exists a price such that i and M are both strictly better o¤ by trading at this price.
Part (b) states when such a trade is bene…cial for the world as a whole.
To understand the theorem, consider …rst part (a), and suppose that the last term in (3.7) is negligible (for example, because x i y i ). In this case, trade is bene…cial for i
. While such a deposit would be exploited when owned by i 2 N , after the transaction M prefers to preserve it, since the revenues gained by exploiting it are less than the environmental harm.
Things are somewhat more complicated when x i 6 = y i . After selling the deposit to M , country i exports less and M imports less. By Lemma 1, M …nds it optimal to rely less on supply-side and more on demand-side policies, and the equilibrium price is slightly reduced. Thus, @p=@ > 0. M is indi¤erent to this change in the price, since M is always setting the policies such that the price is optimal from M 's point of view. However, the increase in p is bene…cial to i if i is a net exporter of fuel. Thus, an exporter is always willing to sell deposits satisfying c 2 (p; B 0 M (y M ) H). In contrast, if i 2 N is a net importer, then the increase in p is harmful to i; country i may thus be unwilling to sell the deposit even if it has a high extraction cost and M would have preserved it rather than exploited it. In sum, it is more likely that i sells the deposit to M if i is an exporter and if c is so high that M will preserve it. The larger (x i y i ) and c are, the larger are the gains from trade. Part (b) states when such a trade is bene…cial for the society as a whole. Condition (3.8) is di¤erent from (3.7), thanks to the e¤ect on p. If i 2 N sells a deposit to M , p increases and, for country j 2 N ni, this is bene…cial if j is an exporter, but harmful if j is an importer. Thus, if the other countries are, on average, fuel importers, then i and M may trade a deposit even though this reduces welfare for the world as a whole. If the other countries are, as a group, exporters, then i may not sell a deposit to M even though such a trade would be bene…cial for the world.
The above reasoning presumes that i takes into account that its sale or purchase of deposits may a¤ect the equilibrium price of fuel. This can be consistent with the assumption that i takes the fuel price as given at stage 3: The individual consumers and producers in country i may take the fuel price as given, even if their government realizes that selling national deposits may (if only marginally) a¤ect the world fuel price.
Alternatively, if the fuel price is determined by M 's policy at stage 2, it is …xed for everyone at stage 3; however, i's sale at stage 1 can in ‡uence M 's policy at stage 2 and thus the price at stage 3. 
The deposit market equilibrium
The market clears when there exists no pair of countries that would both strictly bene…t from trading some of their deposits at some price. The market equilibrium cannot be unique since, if two countries exploit one deposit each, they could easily exchange those two deposits, which would constitute another equilibrium. Nevertheless, I can state the 17 Instead of maximizing U M by choosing x M and y M at stage 2, suppose M chooses p and, say, x M . Also in this case, (3.2)-(3.4) must hold and the …rst-order conditions for the policy are going to be the same.
following result:
Theorem 2. In every equilibrium of the deposit market, M's equilibrium policy (3.5)-(3.6) implements the …rst-best (3.1).
This result might be surprising since (3.5) appears to be substantially di¤erent from the …rst-best (3.1). The equilibrium from stage 2 is generally ine¢ cient because of freeriding, consumption leakage, production leakage, and M 's market power. In addition, Theorem 1 states that i and M may trade too much or too little. It turns out that all these problems vanish once the deposit market has cleared.
Theorem 2 follows from Lemmas 2 and 3:
Lemma 2. In every equilibrium,
When the market for deposits clears, every country expects to rely on neither imports nor exports of fossil fuel. That this is a feasible equilibrium should not be surprising since M can equally well sell a deposit to i as sell the fuel exploited afterwards. Lemma 2 goes further, however, in claiming that x i = y i always. This follows from Theorem 1: Suppose i 2 N is an importer of fuel. If M sells a small deposit to i, which is such that any owner would exploit it (c < H 0 B 0 M ), then M is exports less afterwards. According to Lemma 1, p declines, which is bene…cial for the importing country i. Thus, i is willing to pay more for the deposit than M requires for giving it up. In equilibrium, therefore, i cannot be an importer. For similar reasons, i cannot be an exporter, either.
The next stepping stone for Theorem 2 is:
In other words, C 0 i (:) is vertical and jumps at the equilibrium x i , i 2 N . As suggested by Theorem 1, the reason is that M is willing to purchase the deposits which i 2 N is almost indi¤erent about exploiting. If the marginal cost c of exploiting a deposit is almost as high as the price p, then i is willing to sell the deposit for a low price (p c). If M purchases this deposit without exploiting it, M 's bene…t is reduced pollution. This gain is roughly H 0 > 0, certainly larger than the price for the deposit when c p. Intuitively, if M considers purchasing and preserving any of i's deposits, it is cheapest to buy deposits that are expensive to exploit. Hence, when the market for deposits clears, the supply of i 2 N is locally inelastic.
Combined, Lemmas 1-3 imply that
Since the supply of country i 2 N is locally inelastic, M does not fear supply-side leakage, and it can rely entirely on supply-side politics. Moreover, since there is no need to regulate demand, there is no consumption leakage and the marginal bene…ts of fossil fuel are equalized across countries. Deposits that are pro…table but socially ine¢ cient to exploit, c 2 (p H 0 ; p), are purchased (according to Theorem 1) and preserved (in line with Lemma 1) by M .
The policy is simple to implement in practice. Instead of calculating taxes for consumption and production, M simply purchases the deposits that are most expensive to exploit. Thereafter, M implements the …rst-best by setting aside these deposits, or by imposing an extraction tax ( x = H 0 ) high enough to make them unpro…table. Finally, market forces equalize marginal bene…ts and neither demand nor trade needs regulation (i.e., y = I = 0).
Example
The outcome is particularly clean if the supply and demand curves are initially identical and linear in every country:
Let m measure the number of members in M , and let each face the marginal harm h, such that
Without a deposit market, i 2 N would consume and supply x 0 in Figure The cost of purchasing these deposits depends on the allocation of bargaining power.
As explained in Section 4.6, M must pay the area + if M can make a conditional take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, but twice this amount if some nonparticipant makes the take-it-orleave-it o¤er. If every deposit has an owner that ignores the consumer surplus, for example because nonparticipants can be divided into producers or consumers, then M only needs to pay if it has all the bargaining power. In fact, if ownership is initially concentrated, it su¢ ces to pay . This sum may well be negative, since the seller is then glad to
give up some of its deposits when it anticipates that, as a consequence, M is going to modify its policies in a way that increases the fuel price. Thus, purchasing inputs might be substantially cheaper than Coaseian bargaining to reduce nonparticipants'consumption. 
Generalizing the result
The next four subsections generalize the main result (Theorem 2) by endogenizing the technology and by allowing for multiple periods, heterogeneous fuel, and nonparticipants that are harmed by the pollution. The following subsections discuss (less formally) alter-native market structures and participation in the coalition.
Endogenous technology
Developing new technology is a central issue in the debate on how to cope with climate
change. An important extension of the above model is thus to endogenize the technologies, and let countries invest in them. This extension, it turns out, strengthens the case for a market in deposits.
Suppose that every i 2 M [ N can invest r i in technology at cost k i (r i ), where To simplify, let i 2 M [ N be a price-taker when investing -for example, because investments are made by private entities in country i. Then, e B 0 i (:) is the willingness to pay for new technology in country i. Whether M 's policy has been set, or will be set, in equilibrium: 
Are the investments of i 2 N optimal? A larger r i reduces the need to buy fossil fuel, and the price declines. This is good for an importer but, from a social point of view, the sum of all terms-of-trade e¤ects is zero. 19 However, the lower price reduces supply when supply is somewhat elastic (i.e., when S 0 > 0) and emissions then decline as well.
Since this bene…t is not internalized by i 2 N , it invests too little compared to the social optimum when S 0 > 0, no matter how the investments are times.
Proposition 2. (i) For every i 2 N; the investment level r i is lower than the socially optimal level, and it is strictly lower if and only if S 0 (p) > 0: (ii) The bene…t for M of i's marginal investment is given by:
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (4.1) 
which is equal to M 's ideal consumption tax, or tari¤. When this tax is positive, M strictly bene…ts from a marginally larger r i , i 2 N . If it could, M would then like to share its technology with i, or to invest directly in the nonparticipating countries.
If policies are set before investments, M can indeed in ‡uence i's investment. To encourage investments, M sets policies that generate a high fuel price. This can be done by restricting M 's supply rather than its demand. Thus, pre-investment policies may rely more on supply-side politics and less on demand-side politics than would post-investment policies.
19 In contrast to M , i 2 N does not set p and it does indeed care about how r i a¤ects p. Thus, if i; j 2 N , i 6 = j, we can write
Summing over these, the terms-of-trade e¤ects cancel since
Proposition 3. The equilibrium policy is given by Lemma 1 whether the policy is chosen before or after the investments. But the demand is more elastic when the policy is chosen …rst: If M sets policies before the investment stage, demand is more elastic. A larger p is then both reducing y i + r i and increasing r i , thus leading to a further decline in y i . If the last two terms in (3.5) are positive, they decrease in jD 0 i (:)j, ceteris paribus. As a consequence, x M must decline while y M must increase.
Proposition 3 implies that M 's optimal policy is sensitive to the particular timing.
While M would prefer to announce tough supply-side policies before the investment stage in order to encourage investments, after the investment stage it prefers to rely more on demand-side politics. The ideal policy of M is thus not time-consistent.
In summary, for a generic distribution of deposits, investments in renewable energy are suboptimal for all countries. Nonparticipants invest too little, amplifying their existing overpollution. To encourage them to invest more, M would like to commit to tough supply-side policies rather than demand-side policies, but this may not be time-consistent.
For these reasons, the gains from trade are actually larger than in Section 3. If M purchases a deposit from i 2 N , then p increases, i invests more, and M bene…ts more.
When the deposit market clears, the outcome is e¢ cient. Also for this case, Theorem 2 continues to hold:
Theorem 2 (ii). In every equilibrium of the deposit market, M's equilibrium policy implements the …rst-best, whether it is chosen before or after investments.
The result follows, almost as a corollary, from Propositions 1-3 and Lemmas 1-3. If the equilibrium in the deposit market is as described in Section 3.3, then y i = x i and M 's investment is optimal, according to Proposition 1. Lemma 3 states that S continues to be an equilibrium. The proof that this must be true in all equilibria follows the same steps as before.
As a variant of the model, suppose the r i 's were not chosen by private investors but by governments. For i = M , this turns out to be irrelevant since, as noted, r M is optimal from M 's point of view. Also for i 2 N , this change would not matter if government i took the price p as given, perhaps because the price had already been set by M at the policy stage. However, if i anticipates that r i may a¤ect the price, the …rst-order condition for r i becomes:
Better technology reduces the fuel price (@p=@r i < 0). The lower price is good for country i 2 N if it imports fuel but bad if it exports. Hence, importers invest more than exporters.
If (y i x i ) is very large, i may actually invest too much, compared to the social optimum, just as M would have done, according to Proposition 1. With a deposit market, however, y i = x i and it does not matter whether i, at the investment stage, takes p as given or not.
The …rst-best continues to be an equilibrium whether investments are private or public.
Multiple periods
A one-period model may well capture a dynamic world. In particular, suppose the environmental damage H (:) is a function of cumulated emissions, no matter at which point in time they take place. Then, the …rst-best is still implemented by the equilibrium above:
M only needs to buy and set aside certain deposits at the start of the game, and then let the market work out the allocation of consumption. If time is a dimension in this allocation, the equilibrium price path optimally allocates the remaining production and consumption over time.
Without a deposit market, however, di¢ culties arise. In addition to the ine¢ ciencies already discussed, there will be intertemporal leakages. If M is expected to reduce its future consumption, the expected future price declines. This makes it more attractive for the nonparticipants to extract fuel now. This e¤ect has been referred to as the "green paradox" by Sinn (2008) , since a harsher environmental policy (in the future) can actually increase emissions (today). Clearly, the green paradox reduces the value of an anticipated demand-side policy.
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To illustrate this, suppose there are two periods, t 2 f1; 2g, and let 2 (0; 1) be the common discount factor. As before, the extraction costs are associated with the deposits.
Thus, if C i (:) is i's extraction cost function, the cost of extracting x i;1 units in period 1 is C i (x i;1 ), while the remaining cost of extracting x i;2 in period 2 is C i (x i;1 + x i;2 ) C i (x i;1 ).
To capture the intuition that climate change is a long-term problem, let the harm H (:) be experienced only in the second period. Since greenhouse gases have a long-lasting impact on the climate, suppose H (:) is a function of cumulated emissions. When the prices in periods 1 and 2 are p 1 and p 2 , the payo¤ for i 2 M [ N is:
where the index-function i = 0 for i 2 N , and M = 1.
If M can commit to future policies, the timing of the game is the following. In the …rst period, M sets fx M;1 ; y M;1 ; x M;2 ; y M;2 g. Thereafter, the …rst-period fossil fuel market clears. Finally, the second-period market clears.
For given prices, the demand in country i 2 N is y i;1 = D i;1 (p 1 ) B 0 1 i;1 (p 1 ) and
i;2 (p 2 ). In the second period, i's cumulated supply is given by
In the …rst period, i must consider whether to extract a marginal deposit now or later. This leads to x i;1 = S i ((p 1 p 2 ) = (1 )). 21 In each period, the market must clear, such that I t y M;t x M;t = P N (x i;t y i;t ) 8t 2 f1; 2g. Anticipating all this, M 's optimal policy for both periods are derived in the Appendix.
Just as before, the sum of the taxes must equal the marginal environmental harm. 20 A similar e¤ect is identi…ed by Kremer and Morcom (2000) , who show that an anticipated future crackdown on the illegal harvesting of ivory may raise current poaching. 21 To see this, take a small deposit with marginal cost c. It is extracted in period 1 rather than period 2 if this gives a higher present discounted value of the pro…t:
Proposition 4. If M can commit, its second-period policies are given by:
M;2 (y M;2 ) = p 2 + dp 2 dI 2 S 0 (p 2 ) H 0 + dp 1 dI 2 I 1 + dp 2 dI 2 I 2 ; (4.3)
2 ) 3 p 2 1 dp 2 dI 2 S 0 (p 2 ) H 0 + dp 1 dI 2 I 1 + dp 2 dI 2 I 2 ; (4.4) where :
On the other hand, if M cannot commit to future policies, its second-period policy is given by Lemma 1, above. A comparison shows that the two policies are, in general, quite di¤erent. First, when committing to second-period policies, M would like to consider the e¤ect on its terms of trade not only for the second period, but also for the …rst. Once the second period has arrived, this e¤ect is sunk and M can ignore it. This implies that M 's ideal tax policy is not time-consistent, even when there is no environmental harm.
22
Second, even if we abstract from the terms of trade e¤ects, M 's preferred policy under commitment is generally di¤erent from the equilibrium policy when it cannot commit.
Even if I 1 = I 2 = 0, (4.3)-(4.4) implies that M would prefer to commit to rely more on supply-side policies, and less on demand-side policies, than to do what it is going to …nd optimal in period 2 ((3.5)-(3.6)). With such a commitment, M minimizes the intertemporal consumption leakage and the problems of the green paradox, discussed above. Unfortunately, if M cannot commit, this policy is not time-consistent.
Consider now a deposit market at the beginning of period 1. For the same reason as before, Lemma 2 continues to hold and x M;t = y M;t , 8t 2 f1; 2g. M purchases from country i 2 N the deposits that are most costly to extract. Thus, Lemma 3 continues to hold for the second period (i.e., for p = p 2 ). This does not imply that i's supply is inelastic in period 1, but it does become locally inelastic in period 2. When we substitute
, it is clear that M relies entirely on supply-side policies in period 2 whether or not it can commit. M 's policy is thus time consistent. As the Appendix shows, once the deposit market clears, M relies on supply-side policies also in the …rst period, and intertemporal e¢ ciency is ensured.
Theorem 2 (iii).
With a deposit market in the beginning of the game, the …rst-best is implemented by M's equilibrium policies whether or not M can commit to future policies.
M 's policy is simple to implement once the deposit market clears. It can just set aside the costliest deposits and thereafter let the market clear, or it can set extraction taxes, x;t , t 2 f1; 2g, high enough to make the marginal deposits unpro…table. As shown in the Appendix, these taxes should be Pigouvian:
Note that the tax should be positive in both periods. If there were an extraction tax only in the second period, the private suppliers would prefer to extract in period 1 rather than in period 2, just to avoid paying this tax. This would generate the green paradox, discussed above, and the outcome would be dynamically ine¢ cient. To avoid this, the present-discounted value of the tax should be the same across periods. Note that this reasoning continues to hold if there are more than two periods: in either case, a deposit market at the beginning of the game implements the …rst-best.
Things would be more complicated, however, if M not only cared about the aggregate emissions, but also the time at which they took place. M may then have an incentive to trade deposits at the beginning of every period. Whether this would ensure e¢ ciency would depend on the structure of the deposit market. For example, if M could in ‡uence the future price that it would pay for deposits by extracting less today, it would distort its extraction path in order to in ‡uence its future terms of trade. For similar reasons, a rental market for the right to extract deposits may not guarantee the …rst-best, if the future rental price can be in ‡uenced by M 's extraction path.
Heterogeneous fuels
The analysis above assumed that consuming one unit of fossil fuel created one unit of pollution. In reality, fuel types di¤er in their carbon content: natural gas pollutes less than oil which, in turn, pollutes less than coal. Oil …elds themselves di¤er widely: exploiting Canadian oil sands pollutes more than extracting North Sea oil, for instance.
The model can accommodate heterogeneous fuels both within and between countries.
For a small deposit of size , let c be its marginal production cost and e its marginal emission content. Thus, the cost and emissions from exploiting this deposit are c and e . As before, the deposits belonging to i 2 N are ordered according to their extraction costs. 23 If country i 2 N supplies x i units, its total emission is E i (x i ), where E 0 i (x i ) is the marginal emission content of a deposit located at x i . If E 0 i (x i ) is increasing (decreasing), the fuel that is most costly to extract is most (least) polluting. Assume that E 
, and the harm experienced by M is H (
. Optimally, marginal bene…ts should be equalized across countries and a marginal deposit should be extracted if and only if:
To …nd the equilibrium, note that stage 3 has the same outcome as in Section 3.1. At stage 2, M sets policies, taking into account leakages and their emission content.
Lemma 4. M 's equilibrium policy implements:
Note that M focuses more on reducing its demand and less on reducing its supply if fuel abroad tends to be dirtier than domestic fuel, particularly if this is true for foreign countries with a very elastic supply function. Just as before, one can easily …nd taxes that implement this policy. If E 0 M is much smaller than E 0 i , M may …nd it optimal to subsidize domestic extraction ( x < 0). This could be the case if, for example, the participants 23 The deposits belonging to M are ordered according to c + eH 0 (:), where H 0 (:) is evaluated at the equilibrium pollution level. The reason is that M always exploits the deposits with the smallest c+eH 0 (:). 24 This requires that deposits having almost identical extraction costs also have similar emission content. This assumption saves a step in the proof. possess natural gas while the nonparticipants rely on coal. The lemma generalizes the result by Golombek et al. (1995) , who extend the model by Hoel (1994) to allow for three types of fuel.
Although Lemma 4 describes M 's best policy for coping with free-riding and leakages, the outcome is not …rst-best for a generic allocation of deposits. In addition to the ine¢ ciencies discussed already, country i 2 N tends to exploit the wrong deposits: since i 2 N does not internalize the environmental harm, it might exploit deposits that have a higher emission content and larger social costs than some other deposits that it …nds too costly to exploit. For this reason, a deposit market is even more important than before.
Suppose i consider selling a marginal deposit to M . Both can bene…t if condition (3.7) in Theorem 1 is replaced by:
Theorem 2 (iv). In every equilibrium of the deposit market, M's equilbrium policy 
Shared harm and shared ownership
So far, I have assumed that nonparticipants do not experience any harm from pollution.
This assumption may approximate reality if the nonparticipants' harm is only a small fraction of the total harm. Moreover, if signing an international agreement is necessary to overcome domestic resistance for a climate policy, the nonparticipants'harm would not a¤ect the equilibrium derived above. However, the above equilibrium would no longer implement the …rst-best, since M would not internalize the nonparticipants'harm when deciding how many deposits to set aside.
While H (:) measures the total harm, as before, let H i (:) measure the harm experienced by country i. Clearly, H (:)
The optimal x i s can be derived as before. Then, de…ne:
Parameter i 2 [0; 1] measures i's marginal harm as a fraction of the total marginal harm at the optimal emission levels.
Oil companies often share the ownership of oil …elds. Suppose now that ownership of fossil fuel deposits can be similarly shared by countries. If a country owns a certain fraction of a given deposit, and this deposit is exploited, then the country receives a share of the pro…t equal to its ownership share.
Theorem 2 (v).
There exist an equilibrium in the deposit market where i owns i of every deposit satisfying:
This equilibrium implements the …rst-best.
Take a small deposit of size with marginal extraction cost c satisfying (4.9). If it were exploited, i's bene…t would be i [B 0 i (y i ) c H 0 (:)] < 0, and every i would thus prefer to not exploit such a deposit. This is socially optimal, since a deposit should
are not exploited by any owner. Hence, when i owns i of every deposit satisfying (4.9), the …rst-best is implemented, no matter whether the owners make decisions by unanimity or majority rule. Lemma 2 continues to hold and, after setting aside deposits satisfying (4.9), further regulation is neither necessary nor desired. It follows that B 0 i (y i ) is equalized across countries.
The shares i constitute an equilibrium since no two owners would bene…t by trading such a deposit share. If the consequence following such a transaction would be that a marginal deposit would be exploited, the new owner j would bene…t i (p c) H 0 j (:), which is less than the harm experienced by the previous owner i. This is not a unique equilibrium when jN j > 1, however. If a deposit is owned and exploited by a single owner, it might not pay any individual country to step in and purchase a fraction of this deposit with the aim of preserving it. If the multiple potential owners cannot coordinate such a takeover, other equilibria exist which fail to implement the …rst-best.
The market structure for fuel
Even a nonparticipating country may have the market power to in ‡uence the fuel price, and could generally have an interest in regulating its supply and demand in order to improve its terms of trade. Allowing for this would change the game somewhat -if there were no deposit market.
For instance, suppose that country o 2 N has the power to set the fuel price at stage 3, while every i 2 N no takes the price as given at stage 3, just as before. If country o takes x M and y M as given (determined at stage 2), then it is easy to show that o's policy must satisfy:
: (4.10)
Thus, country o sets a higher price if it is a net exporter. This implies that if M consumes more or extracts less, the price increases, just as before. Condition (4.10) should be taken into account at stage 2, and M 's optimal policy changes somewhat, compared to Lemma 1.
However, once the deposit market clears, Lemma 2 holds, x o = y o , and (4.10) can be
This condition is exactly the same as before, and the fact that country o can set the price then has no impact on M 's policy. It continues to be the case that each country is self-su¢ cient in fuel, in equilibrium, and thus has no incentive to distort the world price by regulating its consumption, supply, or trade.
The market structure for deposits
The analysis above assumes that the deposit market clears where there exist no pair of countries, and no price, such that one country can sell a deposit to the other at that price and make both strictly better o¤. If this condition is violated, there are still gains from trade. The condition is actually stronger than necessary, since the proofs consider trade only between M and i 2 N . I do not need to allow for trade between i and j, if i, j 2 N .
Relying on this de…nition, there has been no need to specify how this equilibrium may be implemented. But there are several possibilities. A simple example is to suppose that country i 2 M [ N can make a conditional take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to all the other countries, specifying a new allocation of deposits (thus, implicitly specifying a vector of transactions) and a vector of payments to be made. If any country can veto this proposal, the outcome gives Lemmas 2-3, and thus Theorem 2. 25 This procedure is referred to as "conditional bids" by Segal (1999) and "no free-riding" by Joskow and Tirole (2000) .
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The price M must pay will obviously depend on the allocation of bargaining power. If i 2 N makes a conditional take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, it can demand that M pays its entire surplus of the transaction, which is 2 ( + ) in the example of Section 3.5. If M makes a conditional o¤er which must be accepted by everyone, it su¢ ces to pay the area + .
Furthermore, it is enough to pay if M can separate the producers from the consumers (e.g., because they are located in di¤erent countries). In fact, M can get away by paying less than if the producers internalize the increase in p that is going to follow. If there is only one producer, it "looses" from the transaction, an amount that may very well be negative. In sum, "buying coal" may be substantially cheaper than paying the 25 To see this, suppose that if there is no trade in the deposit market, country j gets utility U j : With a deposit market, j gets U j , which depends on the allocation of deposits, minus q j , the payment it must make. If i 2 M [ N can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the rest, it maximizes
The constraints will certainly bind in equilibrium; i thus maximizes
, and therefore P M [N U j , the aggregate surplus. Su¢ cient conditions for the maximum are given by Lemmas 2-3. In all equilibria of this game, x M = y M , but in some equilibria, x i 6 = y i for some i 2 N . Thus, this game has equilibria that do not necessarily clear the market, given the way the equilibrium is de…ned; nevertheless, Theorem 2 continues to hold, (since it only requires x M = y M and not x i = y i 8i 2 N ). This implies that the de…nition of a market equilibrium used above is stronger than necessary. 26 However, as these papers show, other market structures fail to implement the e¢ cient equilibrium. For example, if M makes observable nonconditional take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the other countries, then M may prefer to restrict trade in deposits below the e¢ cient level in order to a¤ect its terms of trade. nonparticipants to reduce their consumption.
Participation
There is no consensus on how to model participation in the most reasonable way. A common method (see the survey by Barrett, 2005) is to introduce a stage zero into the game, at which every player …rst decides whether to participate. Otherwise, the game unfolds as described in Section 2. To simplify, take the symmetric example in Section 3, but let every country face the same marginal harm h from pollution. Let the total number of countries be l jM [ N j : As before, suppose nonparticipating countries implement no policies on either demand or supply. This might be reasonable if an international treaty is necessary in order to overcome domestic political resistance. In any case, the following results would not change substantially by relaxing this assumption (in line with Section 4.5).
This participation game tends to create a lot of free-riding and incentives to abstain, since abstaining does not a¤ect whether other countries participate. Without a deposit market, each country faces the following trade-o¤: participating is costly since consumption and production decline from x 0 to x in Figure 3 . On the other hand, every other participant reduces its own pollution by @x =@m = h= (a + c) units. As in Barrett (2005) , the equilibrium number of participants is just three! Adding a deposit market can either raise or reduce participation. On the one hand, the participating members are always better o¤ with a deposit market. Moreover, joining this coalition reduces pollution by h= (a + c) units not only for the participants, but for every country. On the other hand, nonparticipants are also better o¤ compared to the situation without a deposit market. The coalition is successful in reducing emissions from every country. Paying for this is costly, however, and every participant is expected to share these costs. Ultimately, whether participation is more or less attractive with a deposit market depends on the deposit-market structure. Even if M can make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, the price depends on whether it is dealing with symmetric countries or simply producers (as in the asymmetric example). The function bxc calculates the largest integer weakly smaller than x.
If M makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to countries, it must pay each nonparticipating country the area + in Figure 3 . This price is so high that the motivation to participate declines, compared to the situation without a deposit market. If such a decline is important, potential members would thus prefer to commit, before the …rst stage, to not using a deposit market later on. Such a decision is not time consistent, however. After the participation stage, M would always prefer to purchase deposits.
On the other hand, if M only needs to compensate the producers of fossil fuel, paying the area su¢ ces. Since this price is lower, participation becomes more attractive. If a c, participation is always larger with a deposit market than without, as long as l > 4.
If a=c l (l 2), full participation is possible.
Domestic opposition and lobbying
A tough climate policy might be supported by citizens and environmentalists, but producers as well as consumers are harmed when taxes are introduced on demand and supply.
Deposit owners are stuck, however, and unable to move from one country to another, which may reduce their political clout. Industries relying on energy, on the other hand, may credibly threaten to relocate abroad. Babiker (2005) shows that leakage can be much larger if …rms can exit and enter the market.
Without a deposit market, such consumers can bene…t a lot from moving from a participating country to a nonparticipating one. In the example above, the price is bhm= (a + c) units higher in M than in N . With a deposit market, however, the price is equalized across participants and nonparticipants. Consumers then have no incentive to move, and this reduces their political clout when lobbying against a climate treaty.
Moreover, the incentive to lobby against a climate treaty is much smaller when there is a deposit market. 27 If a country participates, the coalition reduces supply further and the equilibrium price on fossil fuel increases by bh= (a + c) in every country. This price increase is only a fraction (1=m) of the price increase for i's consumers if i would join M when no deposit market existed.
In sum, with a market for deposits, industries relying on energy have less incentive to lobby against membership in a climate treaty and have, in any case, less credibility when threatening to relocate. Participation in a climate treaty thus meets less domestic resistance if there is a deposit market.
Conclusions and limitations
A climate coalition faces several dilemmas. Not only are nonparticipants polluting too much, but if the coalition reduces its consumption of fossil fuel, the world price declines and nonparticipants consume more. If the coalition reduces its supply, nonparticipants extract more from their deposits. Furthermore, nonparticipants invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's best policy distorts trade and is not time-consistent. This paper investigates whether trading fossil fuel deposits can mitigate these problems. As argued in the Introduction, the right to exploit deposits might be contractible even if Coaseian bargaining on pollution levels is impossible. Theorem 1 states that the coalition often bene…ts from purchasing and preserving deposits that are, in any case, costly to exploit. While such trade may harm third parties, Theorem 2 shows that, once the deposit market clears, the outcome is …rst-best. In equilibrium, the coalition purchases the right to exploit deposits that are costly or polluting when exploited. This eliminates the supply-side leakage, and the coalition implements its ideal policy simply by reducing its supply of fuel. There is no need to regulate trade or consumption and there is thus no consumption leakage. The fossil fuel price is equalized across countries, which induces optimal investments in technology. The …rst-best is thus implemented, even if some countries do not participate in the coalition.
Normatively, the result suggests that rather than focusing on reducing consumption, climate policies should focus on the supply side -including the supply of other countries.
More generally, the result shows that e¢ ciency can be obtained without Coaseian bargaining ex post, if crucial input factors are tradeable ex ante. This insight can be applied to other contexts. For example, boycotting timber from tropical forests would decrease the world price and lead other countries to raise their demand. To prevent such leakage, a wiser strategy may be to purchase the forest or pay countries to preserve their forests. The recent emergence of REDD funds is thus consistent with the prediction of this paper.
The case for "buying coal" is developed in a benchmark model that abstracts from a number of practical issues. First, the emissions from exploiting a deposit may depend on the extractor's carefulness (or method of extraction) as well as the deposit itself. If such carefulness is noncontractible, moral hazard arises with and without a deposit market.
Second, a country may own unknown or potential deposits, and with some e¤ort it can determine whether these contain fossil fuel. Since the incentive to search for new deposits is stronger if the fuel price is high, countries may search more if they can there is a deposit market. The e¤ort to search is then suboptimally high, since a nonparticipant does not internalize the environmental consequences if a new deposit is detected and exploited.
Alternatively, it may gain from selling such a deposit even if it is not exploited and thus has no social value. In principle, the climate coalition has an incentive to purchase potential deposits, or to pay others for not searching. If such contracts cannot be made, the possibility of searching for new deposits would weaken the e¢ ciency result above.
Third, after selling a deposit located within its national boundary, a country may have a strong incentive to nationalize the deposit and recapture its value. If nationalization is a threat, the coalition may prefer to lease the deposit instead, and simply pay the owner for not exploiting it right now. Whether the right to exploit deposits is for sale or for rent, e¢ ciency follows, in the one-period model. In a dynamic model, however, the parties may distort their policies in order to in ‡uence future rental prices. Future research should investigate the best role for deposit trading when these obstacles are taken into account.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Di¤erentiating (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) gives:
;
Maximizing U M w.r.t. x M and y M s.t. (6.1) gives (3.5) as the …rst-order conditions. The second-order conditions hold if C M and H are su¢ ciently convex, and they always hold in equilibrium. To see this, note that the …rst-order conditions when maximizing w.r.t. x M and p becomes:
The second-order conditions require that
The …rst two conditions are, respectively:
Of the two conditions above, the …rst always hold. The second holds if H is su¢ ciently convex. However, once the deposit market clears (x i = y i ), the second condition boils down to:
which always hold.
The cross derivative is:
which is smaller if H is very convex. When the deposit market clears, this boils down to:
so the third condition (for the second-order condition to hold) becomes:
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider an equilibrium allocation of deposits giving cost functions C i (:) and equilibrium productions x i 8i, and
Take a small deposit of size with a marginal exploitation cost c < B 0 (y M ) H 0 , small enough to make the deposit pro…table to exploit whether owned by i or M . If the deposit market clears, i cannot own such a deposit if M would value it more than i. If the right to exploit is transferred from i to M , i's utility becomes:
Whether or not C 0 i (:) is singular at x i , we can use the envelope theorem to di¤erentiate (6.2). This gives:
After the transaction, M 's utility becomes:
where I let M maximize w.r.t. p and x M instead of, for example, y M and x M . In any case, (3.2)-(3.4) must be satis…ed, implying
thus a function of p and x M but not . Using the envelope theorem when di¤erentiating (6.4), we get simply
The sum of utilities for M and i is thus (x i y i ) dp=d , while for the society as a whole, one should take into account j's bene…t (x j y j ) dp=d , j 2 N ni. Note that dp=d > 0 follows when di¤erentiating U M in (6.4) w.r.t. p and the second-order condition holds. Next, consider a deposit c 2 (B 0 (y M ) H 0 ; p), such that M would not exploit it. After the transaction, M 's utility becomes:
where
Using the envelope theorem when di¤erentiating (6.6), we get simply,
The change in the utility of i is (6.3), as before. Thus, i and M jointly bene…t if c B 0
For the world as a whole, one should also take into account j's bene…t (x j y j ) dp=d , j 2 N ni. 
If the right to exploit this deposit were transferred from i to M , i's utility gain would be (6.3), as before. But M would not produce from this deposit when x M = y M , according to Lemma 1, and after the transaction M 's utility would be: 6.8) where the variables must satisfy (3.2)-(3.4), implying
since i's supply is reduced by relative to the initial S i (p). Using the envelope theorem when di¤erentiating (6.8), we get
Substituting y i = x i , the sum of (6.3) and (6.9) is
where I …rst used (6.7) and then Lemma 1 and 2. Since the total gain is strictly positive, there exist some price which makes both i and M better o¤ following the transaction, implying that the initial allocation cannot be an equilibrium. It follows that for every
, M would strictly bene…t by increasing y M while simultaneously obtaining i's deposits with marginal cost c > p (such that i would not increase its production following the increase in y M ). Since neither p nor unused deposits matter for i 2 N when x i = y i , i would be indi¤erent to such a transaction.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Note that @U
By di¤erentiating the …rst-order conditions (as in the proof of Lemma 1), we …nd @p=@r i = 1=
00 j (p) < 0 for pre-investment policies, while after the investment stage, @p=@r i < 0 follows from the second-order condition when maximizing U M w.r.t. p. Thus, if S 0 (p) > 0, socially optimal investments are given by k
, so the equilibrium investment r i is strictly smaller than the optimal r i . (ii) At the policy stage, it must hold for M in (6.10) that @p=@r i = 1=
, whether x M and y M are sunk or yet to be optimally chosen. Substituting in (6.10) concludes the proof. Alternatively, for post-investment policies, it follows from the envelope theorem (when maximizing U M w.r.t. x M and p) that @U M =@r i = e B 0 M p, which can be written as (4.1), given (3.5).
Proof of Proposition 3: Lemma 1 continues to hold given the demand function D i (p) and the supply function S i (p).When r i is sunk, demand is given by:
Suppose now that r i is decided after M 's policy is set. The …rst-order condition for r i , i 2 N , is p = k 0 i (r i ). Di¤erentiating this, we get dr i =dp = 1=k 00 i (r i ). Thus, demand is now given by
The proofs below for Lemmas 1-4 permit heterogeneous fuels, as discussed in Section 4.3. Lemmas 1-3 are obtained by setting E i (x i ) = x i .
Proof of Lemma 1'and 4: Di¤erentiating (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) gives:
M 's problem is:
giving the …rst-order conditions for x M and y M :
Proof of Lemma 2': Consider an equilibrium allocation of deposits giving cost functions C i (:) and equilibrium productions x i 8i, and x i = S i (p) = C 0 1 i (p) 8i 2 N . Take a small deposit of size with a marginal exploitation cost c and emission content e, both small enough to make the deposit pro…table to exploit whether owned by i or M . If the right to exploit is transferred from i to M , i's utility becomes: Whether or not C 0 (:) is singular at x i , we can use the envelope theorem to di¤erentiate (6.12). This gives: dU i d = c p (y i x i ) dp d : (6.13)
thus a function of p and x M but not . Using the envelope theorem when di¤erentiating (6.14), we get simply dU M d = p c: (6.15)
Note that the …rst-order condition of (6.14) w.r.t. p is: (6.16) Since (6.16) must decrease in p for the second-order condition to be satis…ed, and since (6.16) is increasing in , it follows that dp=d > 0.
Thus, if y i < x i , the sum of (6.13) and (6.15) is positive, implying that there exist some price which makes both i and M better o¤ following the transaction. If y i > x, both i and M could be better o¤ by the reverse transaction. QED Proof of Lemma 3': The prove the lemma by contradiction, suppose that, for some i 2 N , C 0 i (x i ) were singular at the equilibrium deposit allocation and x i . Then E If the right to exploit this deposit were transferred from i to M , i's utility gain would be (6.13), as before. But M would not produce from this deposit when x i = y i , according to (4.7), and after the transaction M 's utility would be: Substituting y i = x i , the sum of (6.13) and (6.19) is where I …rst used (6.17) and then Lemma 1 and 2. Since the total gain is strictly positive, there exist some price which makes both i and M better o¤ following the transaction, implying that the initial allocation cannot be an equilibrium. The deposit is not exploited by i and i is indi¤erent to transferring it to M . If M owned it, M would exploit it according to (4.7) and thus bene…t from obtaining it. Thus, the initial allocation cannot be an equilibrium. This system of 4n + 2 equations pins down p t , x i;t and y i;t for all i 2 N , t 2 f1; 2g as a function of I 1 and I 2 . Di¤erentiating these equations gives: dy i;t = dp t D 0 i;t ; dx i;1 + dx i;2 = dp 2 S 0 i (p 2 ) ; dx i;1 = dp 1 dp 2 1 S 0 i p 1 p 2 1 ; X N (dx i;1 dy i;1 ) = dI 1 ; X N (dx i;2 dy i;2 ) = dI 2 :
By substitution, we get: X N dp 1 dp 2 1 S 0 i p 1 p 2 1 dp 1 D 0 i;1 = dI 1 ; X N dp 2 S 0 i (p 2 ) dp 1 dp 2 1 S 0 i p 1 p 2 1 dp 2 D 0 i;2 = dI 2 :
i;2 (p 2 ), and solve for dp 1 and dp 2 : dp 2 = dI 2 + dI 1 S At the policy-stage, M chooses fx M;1 ; y M;1 ; x M;2 ; y M;2 g to maximize (4.2) for i = M . The …rst-order conditions for x M;2 and y M;2 give: 1 S 0 2 dp 2 dI 2 H 0 + p 2 + dp 1 dI 2 I 1 + dp 2 dI 2 I 2 2 C 0 M (x M;1 + x M;2 ) ; (6.21) S 0 2 dp 2 dI 2 H 0 + B 0 M;2 p 2 dp 1 dI 2 I 1 dp 2 dI 2 I 2 = 0;
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) is in line with previous results and its proof thus omitted.
(ii): The environmental bene…t of joining is h 2 l= (a + c) since every country is reducing pollution by h= (a + c) compared to when i did not join. But participation implies that i looses the consumer and producer surplus h 2 m 2 =2 (a + c). In addition, i must share 1=m of the expenditures when compensating each of the n = l m nonparticipating producers h 2 m 2 =2 (a + c) : Summing up, participation is bene…cial if Proof for (iii): The environmental bene…t of joining is h 2 l= (a + c), since every country is reducing pollution by h= (a + c) compared to when i did not join. But while i without participating would only loose the consumer surplus ah 2 (m 1) 2 =2 (a + c) 2 , by participation it looses its consumer and producer surplus h 
